In a default corridor [0; B] that the stock price can never enter, a deep outof-the-money American put replicates a pure credit contract (Carr and Wu, 2011) . Assuming discrete (one-period-ahead predictable) cash ‡ows, we show that an endogenous credit-risk model generates, along with the default event, a default corridor at the cash-out ‡ow dates, where B > 0 is given by these out ‡ows (i.e., debt service and negative earnings minus dividends).
In Merton (1974) , a key result is the link between put options and credit protection.
For a leveraged …rm, a corporate bond is the sum of a riskless bond and a short put on the …rm's assets, which is an insight extended along many avenues (see Carr and Wu, 2011) . A derivative contract that directly provides exposition to a …rm's credit risk also exists, namely, credit default swaps. In a striking work, Carr and Wu (2011) introduce a default corridor in which deep out-of-the-money (DOOM) equity puts mirror pure credit contracts-and provide the same direct credit-risk exposition. Speci…cally, in a default corridor, "the stock price stays above a barrier B before default but drops below a lower barrier A after default, thus generating a default corridor [A; B] that the stock price can never enter". In this scenario, "a spread between two co-terminal American put options struck within the corridor replicates a pure credit contract, paying o¤ when and only when default occurs prior to the option expiry"(p: 474). if the jump to zero is from above the barrier B (Carr and Wu) .
In this paper, we study whether endogenous credit-risk models also generate a default corridor. Assuming discrete cash ‡ows, we show that an endogenous credit-risk model generates, along with the (endogenous) default event, a default corridor [0; B] in a natural way. In this endogenous setting, however, the default corridor only necessarily happens at the cash-out ‡ow dates, where B > 0 is given by these out ‡ows, which we require to be one-period-ahead predictable. It follows the equity put that replicates a pure credit contract is not DOOM American, but rather European, expires at out ‡ow dates, holds for any moneyness, and has a strike price lower than the out ‡ows (B) .
In an endogenous model, besides limited liability, which implies nonnegative equity prices, equityholders optimize the default decision and absorb (with their deep pockets) the …rm's net cash ‡ows-in Leland's tradition. This discrete-time cash ‡ow is either an in ‡ow (e.g., a cash dividend) or an out ‡ow. Then an endogenous setting generates, along with the default event, a default corridor at the out ‡ow dates. That is, in contrast to the ex-dividend equity price, which falls on dividend days, if B 1 > 0 is the …rst out ‡ow, either the ex-cash- ‡ow equity price increases and is larger than B 1 at the …rstout ‡ow date if the …rm survives, or it is equal to zero if the …rm defaults (i.e., the equity continuation value C 1 is less than or equal to B 1 ). Speci…cally, the ex-cash- ‡ow equity price equals C 1 1 fC 1 >B 1 g , which is either zero or larger than B 1 >0. Therefore, this model simultaneously generates a default event fC 1 B 1 g and a corridor [0; B 1 ] at the …rst-out ‡ow date (i.e., C 1 1 fC 1 >B 1 g = 2 (0; B 1 ]), in which the stock price cannot enter and in which B 1 is equal to the out ‡ow. By contrast, if equityholders do not absorb the out ‡ow B 1 , but instead B 1 is subtracted from the …rm's assets or is re…nanced, default is delayed until the assets are entirely depleted and a corridor does not exist (i.e., the equity price can be arbitrarily small). Because cash ‡ows are random, that B 1 is one-period predictable (or paid in arrears or a lower bound) is a necessary requirement in our setting; otherwise, the corridor [0; B 1 ] is random. Other than being one-period predictable, cash ‡ows are unconstrained. Hence, the corridor [0; B 1 ] is robust to the process followed by them and the endogenous equity price.
An example in which B 1 is deterministic is when B 1 is given by a bond's coupon or principal (Merton, 1974; Geske, 1977) . In this scenario, if equityholders absorb all coupons, a default corridor is present at all coupon dates. In general, B 1 includes both …nancial and operational leverage, namely, debt service and negative earnings minus dividends. Naturally, if the predictable out ‡ow is rather zero or an in ‡ow B 1 0, such as a cash dividend, defaulting is entirely irrational (i.e., assuming C 1 > 0), implying no credit protection is necessary and the corridor [0; B 1 ] is empty.
Indeed, as in the standard case of call options, we assume endogenous equity prices are strictly positive between out ‡ow dates, which has two implications. First, default is never optimal, and hence a corridor does not exist (is empty) between two out ‡ow dates.
Namely, equity prices can be arbitrarily small without triggering default. Second, a deep in-the-money American put is optimally exercised before expiration (Du¢ e, 2001) .
Therefore, only the European put counterpart replicates a pure credit contract, with a maturity equal to the …rst-out ‡ow date and a strike price (K) less than or equal to the out ‡ow-B 1 . That is, the binary payo¤ of this low strike-price put is given by
Moreover, although in Carr-Wu's model, in-the-money American/European puts struck within the corridor [0; B 1 ] cannot exist because the equity price can never enter in the corridor, in our setting, in-the-money puts exist; that is, the credit-contract replicating put is not necessarily DOOM, but rather a low strike-price (LSP) European put.
The distortion created by an endogenous default corridor implies that only the price of European (not the American) puts that expire at the …rst-out ‡ow date is linear in the strike price falling within [0; B 1 ]. This linear price yields an implied-volatility skew for low strike prices K B 1 , whereby this implied volatility soars because, within the corridor, the put payo¤ is not the capped di¤erence between the strike and equity prices as in a benchmark setting, but rather the strike price (i.e., max f0; K C 1 g < K).
It follows that for riskier …rms, such as speculative-grade …rms, we can have linearin-the-strike-price (falling within [0; B 1 ]) put prices and a steep skew at maturities matching cash-out ‡ows dates. These …rms are more leveraged, which potentially leads to larger out ‡ows, B 1 > 0. By contrast, for investment-grade …rms, these linear-in-
the-strike put prices should correspond to a thinner corridor.
For puts with a shorter maturity than the …rst-out ‡ow date, a default corridor is not there (i.e., equity prices can be small without triggering default). By contrast, for puts with slightly larger maturity than this …rst-out ‡ow date, in which a corridor [0; B 1 ] means the ex-cash- ‡ow equity price is either 0 or larger than B 1 > 0, the equity price is also likely larger than B 1 conditional on nondefault, and the low strike-price put can still provide a good approximation to a digital put-a pure credit contract. Naturally, after 
A coupon-bond model
We consider a two-period model N = 2, n 2 f1; 2g and respective times 0 < T 1 < T 2 .
We denote by V t the value of the …rm's assets, 0 t T 2 . The …rm issues a two-period coupon bond (Merton, 1974; Geske, 1977) , where T 2 is the maturity, D > 0 is the face value, and c D > 0 is the coupon. In this structural setting, we denote by r the riskless rate and assume a Q risk-neutral measure exists.
As in any endogenous credit-risk model, the debt service (coupon or face value) is absorbed by equityholders'deep pockets (e.g., Leland, 1994; Leland and Toft, 1996 We denote by C t the equity continuation value. We assume equityholders'limited liability, which implies C t 0, 0 t T 2 . It follows that because B n > 0, defaulting at T n is optimal if and only if C n B n , n = 1; 2;
with indi¤erence between defaulting and paying the cash out ‡ow if C n = B n . This default choice maximizes equity value; that is, it is endogenous.
Endogenous equity pricing
Given the terminal assets value (V 2 0), the continuation value of equity is de…ned recursively as follows (where, in an abuse of notation, C n = C Tn , n = 1; 2):
In particular, C 1 is the price of a European call, whereas C 0 is the price of a compound option. The de…nition of C 1 and C 2 recognizes the debt service (i.e., the coupon cD and (1 + c) D, respectively) is absorbed by equityholders'deep pockets, and is never subtracted from the …rm's assets (i.e., from V 1 and V 2 ).
Importantly, the process C t is always discontinuous at T 1 (and T 2 ); that is,
Although the left-hand-side limit is only well de…ned if C t does not jump at t = T 1
In addition, we assume the equity continuation value is strictly positive; that is,
As shown next, this assumption implies equity prices are also strictly positive between cash-out ‡ow dates (i.e., conditional on no previous default), and default is never optimal outside the out ‡ow dates.
To de…ne the ex-cash- ‡ow equity price (denoted by E), which is subject to default risk, we introduce an auxiliary binary process, a 2 f0; 1g. Namely, a 0 = 1 and a n = a n 1 1 fCn>Bng , n = 1; 2; :::; N;
and hence a n = 0 indicates the company has defaulted (i.e., a j = 0, j = n; n + 1; :::; N ).
Consequently,
The (ex-cash- ‡ow) equity-price function E n (C n ) is discontinuous at T 1 and T 2 .
That is,
both with positive probability. 4 Likewise, either
In particular, because equityowners absorb the entire debt service, conditional on nondefault (a 2 = 1), the equity value equals the asset value at T 2 ; that is,
Moreover, the discontinuity at T 1 implies the equity-price function is also close to
can be arbitrarily close to zero. However, in the limit t # T 1 ,
implies that for t > T 1 and t not far away from T 1 , the probability that
should be relatively small (i.e., a function of a small t T 1 ).
Importantly, C t > 0 implies E t = C t > 0 between out ‡ow dates, conditional on no previous default. Strictly positive equity prices imply default is not optimal between out ‡ow dates. Hence, we next focus on out ‡ow dates.
The endogenous default event and the default corridor
Implicit in the de…nition of the equity value (i.e., equation (5)) are two endogenousdefault events at periods T 1 and T 2 , that is,
respectively. These two events are endogenous because they maximize equity value, and are default events because they imply equity value becomes zero. These two default 4 The process E t is also discontinuous at T 1 if the …rm survives (otherwise, is zero); that is,
where the limit is only well de…ned if C t does not jump at t = T 1 . events de…ne two respective optimal default thresholds, Y 1 and Y 2 . That is,
In general, Y 1 > 0 and Y 2 > 0 are unique because (i.e., we assume if necessary that)
call-type payo¤s are increasing functions in V . If V depends on stochastic parameters, Y 1 and Y 2 are threshold functions.
Moreover, because the out ‡ows are absorbed by equityholders'deep pockets, from equation (6), these two endogenous default events lead to two default corridors,
respectively, in which the ex-cash- ‡ow equity price cannot enter. That is,
and E 2 = 2 (0; (1 + c) D], at periods T 1 and T 2 , respectively. Thus, at T 1 , the following four default events are equivalent:
fV 1 Y 1 g ; fC 1 c Dg ; fE 1 c Dg ; and fE 1 = 0g ;
which depend, respectively, on the …rm's low asset value, low continuation value, low equity value, and exhausted equity value.
Remark 1. We provide an example in which a default corridor is empty. If c D is exclusively paid from the …rm's assets, the default event at T 1 is trivially given in terms of the asset value, namely, by fV 1 c Dg. This speci…c default event implies a default corridor does not exist at T 1 , because the equity-price function is continuous (i.e., zero or larger than zero). That is, if lim t"T 1 V t = c D + , with > 0 and t < T 1 , V 1 = (after the coupon-payment date), and we assume the value of equity E is arbitrarily close to zero if ! 0.
Moreover, if C 1 V 1 , that is, if equity value is bound by the value of the assets, endogenous default leads to an earlier default than if the …rm's managers entirely deplete the …rm's assets or holdings previous to default.
Remark 2. As in Merton, C 1 > 0 is the premium of a European call that expires at T 2 (with a strike price equal to (1 + c) D). However, if we consider that C 2 = fV 2 Dg + , a default corridor exists at T 2 , but it is very thin; that is,
the continuation value (C) is the same process as in equation (1), because
implying the de…nition of the equity price, default events, and default corridor are robust and carry over for t < T 2 .
If C 2 = fV 2 (1 + c) Dg + , that is, if the entire debt service (coupon and face value)
is depleted from the …rm's assets, E 2 = a 1 C 2 and a default corridor is empty at T 2 .
European puts, digital puts, and pure credit contracts
We denote by K the strike price of puts and calls. At T 1 , we show a low strike-price European equity put becomes a digital put, which replicates a pure credit contract.
That is, for a put with maturity T 1 , the payo¤ reduces to
which is a digital option in the case of low strike-price (LSP) puts, namely, K c D.
The second equality follows from equation (6).
Then, from equation (6), E n = E n 1 fEn>Bng , from which follows 1 fE 1 =0g = 1 fE 1 c Dg , and hence
which replicates a pure credit contract, in which fE 1 c Dg is the endogenousdefault event. In particular, in this endogenous setting, a DOOM put (that replicates a pure credit contract) is rather an LSP put, for all moneyness.
A similar result follows for T 2 , in which B 2 = (1 + c) D; namely,
3 The price of European puts in a default corridor
We study the pricing of European puts/calls in a default corridor.
1) Under the Q-measure, from equation (10), the price of an LSP put with maturity T 1 is given by
Like DOOM puts in Carr and Wu, in our setting, LSP European-put prices are linear in the strike price falling within the corridor (i.e., K c D), a straightforward empirical prediction. The forward price of this European put, scaled by the strike price, gives the one-period risk-neutral default probability.
2) In terms of the implied volatility , where P BS (E 0 ; ) denotes the Black-Scholes-
Then the implied-volatility curve (K) holds that (see the Appendix)
where N () is the cumulative Gaussian-distribution function.
A negative skew, 0 (K) < 0, implies LSP puts are expensive. First, they are more expensive in a default corridor than in the standard case of no corridor. That is, compared to a benchmark setting, LSP European puts that expire at T 1 are overpriced by the following amount:
Conditional on C 1 2 [0; B 1 ], the …rst (second) term covers the in-the-money (out-ofthe-money) part of the put. Second, the deeper out of the money the put is, the more expensive this put is in implied-volatility units. For instance, in our numerical exercise, (K) is unbounded when K ! 0.
3) The same linear (in the strike price) result happens in the case of the secondout ‡ow date T 2 , in which B 2 = (1 + c) D. The price of an LSP put with maturity T 2 is given by
Scaled by the discounted strike price e rTn K, the price di¤erence of two LSP European puts with the same strike but di¤erent maturity equals the probability of default at T 2 , namely,
given that c D < (1 + c) D.
4) For no LSP European puts at T 1 (i.e., K > c D),
and no LSP puts are also more expensive than in a benchmark setting.
5)
Lastly, for European equity puts and calls (with respective prices p t and c t ), with the same strike price (K) and expiring at the …rst-out ‡ow date (T 1 ),
which follows from put-call parity at T 1 . Then, from the law of one price (see the Appendix), put-call parity at T 0 becomes
where
. Similar to the case of a payingdividend stock, put-call parity is also adjusted, in this case, by e rT 1 B 1 Q (V 1 > Y 1 ).
From the last equation, the call price is given by
Speci…cally, for DOOM puts (i.e., K B 1 ), from equation (12),
For example, consider a spread between two co-terminal European calls struck within the corridor, with respective strike prices K 1 and K 2 , K 1 < K 2 B 1 . Then,
which is the one-period risk-neutral surviving probability.
Numerical example: Merton' s structural model
Following Merton (1974), we consider a one-period setting in which equity is a European call, with a strike price of B > 0 and a maturity of T 1 (which are the face value and maturity of a zero-coupon bond). In particular, Merton's model is widely used to infer a …rm's distance to default.
First, we emphasize that although puts with the same maturity as debt are expen- :
For maturities shorter than the debt maturity, a corridor does not exist-the two put payo¤s in Merton's model are the same.
Second, we assume a lognormal asset value,
r is the riskless rate and is volatility. From the Black-Scholes-Merton formula, the equity price is equal to
However, we assume equityholders absorb the out ‡ow B > 0, which implies a default corridor [0; B] exists at T 1 . That is,
Consider a European equity put, with strike price K > 0 and maturity T 1 as well.
Given the same maturity of the equity claim (or Merton's call) and this equity-put derivative, and given that E 1 = V 1 1 fV 1 >Bg , the price of this equity put simpli…es to
where d 1;2K are de…ned akin to d 1;2B with K instead of B. In particular,
Conversely, for a reciprocal call with the same maturity and strike price, the payo¤ in terms of the asset value is given by
where the …rst (second) term corresponds to strike prices higher (lower) than B. It follows that, in contrast to a benchmark setting, low strike-price (i.e., K < B) calls are underpriced, because they pay nothing if V 1 2 (K; B].
Following Carr and Wu, we de…ne B as a low strike price, B = 3. We assume = 30%, r = 2%, a maturity of T 1 = 6 months, and four equity prices E 0 = f2:03; 3:03; 4:03; 6:03g, which are associated with the asset values of V 0 = f5; 6; 7; 9g, respectively. Each price implies a risky, healthier, sound, and super sound …rm. For asset values lower than 5, the implied volatility of low strike-price equity puts quickly soars above 100%. In Figure 1 , we show the four implied-volatility curves, for a range of strike prices K 2 [1; 20]. Hence, the volatility-smile function, (K), solves
and in particular, for K B, e rT 1 K N ( d 2B ; = 0:3) = e rT 1 K N ( d 2K ; (K)) V 0 N ( d 1K ; (K)) :
From Figure 1 , for risky …rms (i.e., V 0 6), the default corridor generates a clear volatility smile, with large implied-volatility levels away from the money. However, for sound …rms (i.e., V 0 7), the default corridor generates more of a volatility smirk, where the implied volatility approximates the asset volatility for strike prices higher than B = 3. We also see the riskier the …rm, namely, the lower V 0 , the larger the implied volatility, which is an example of a leverage e¤ect. These results are robust to the maturity, T 1 2 f3; 6; 12g months. Second, as any endogenous model assumes, substantial evidence shows default is not entirely random, but rather …rms default in poor economic conditions or with expired debt (Asquith et al., 1994; Du¢ e et al., 2007; Campbell et al., 2008; Davydenko, 2012) .
However, because a …rm's bankruptcy has severe economic consequences from layo¤s to large distress costs, creditors may have a say in default (Carey and Gordy, 2007 The distress …rm needs fresh capital, and a large shareholder (L1) announces a capital-injection plan, but only if (in addition to banks extending a new credit line and bondholders increasing the maturity of expiring loans so all stakeholders contribute) it gets the control of the …rm (>50% of shares). L1 o¤ers a price per share of 0.67; an o¤er expiring in six months. In six months, two mutually exclusive scenarios are possible, either L1 does not get control and hence (no capital injection but …rm default and) the equity price sinks to zero, or L1 gets control and the price per share is 0.67 or above.
However, because other equityholders want a better deal than 0.67, they not only put at risk the L1-control plans and solvency of the …rm, but also push down the price per share to a low 0.34 during this six-month period. Associated to this potential takeover, two corridors exist for the troubled …rm. First, a Carr and Wu's corridor Leland-type models. This measure is linked to the default corridor/event of the same endogenous model.
Second, it is related to the literature on the valuation of derivative securities in structural models, a problem that until recently (Geske et al., 2016; Bai et al., 2018) has received limited attention (Toft and Prucik, 1997 This corridor is linked to the endogenous-default event, fE Bg, in which E is the ex-cash- ‡ow equity price and B > 0 is given by the out ‡ows (i.e., debt service and negative earnings minus cash dividends), which we only require to be one-period-ahead predictable. In this setting, the default corridor only necessarily happens at the out ‡ow dates, which implies the low strike-price put (that replicates a pure credit contract) is not DOOM American but rather European style, and expires in the …rst out ‡ow with a strike less than or equal to the out ‡ow. The corridor [0; B 1 ] especially applies to speculative-grade …rms; these …rms are more leveraged, which implies a larger out ‡ow B 1 > 0. If the early-exercise premium is a small fraction of the American price, such as in a DOOM case, the exchanged-listed American price can provide a good approximation to the European counterpart, namely, a pure credit contract.
In sum, although endogenous credit-risk models are preferred by academicians, reduced-form models and credit-risk sensitive securities, such as credit default swaps or DOOM puts, are the workhorse for practitioners. In this paper, we bridge the gap between both worlds by deriving a default corridor in the former setting. 
Online Appendix
The implied volatility of low strike-price European equity puts
For a put option, from the Black-Scholes-Merton formula,
which implies the following two Greeks:
In terms of the implied volatility , the low strike-price (LSP) put price veri…es that
Then, the implied-volatility function, (K), holds that
which is equation (14).
European put-call parity and call pricing
We derive the initial value of the ex-cash- ‡ow equity price at T 1 , where B 1 = cD and a 1 = 1 fC 1 >B 1 g . From equation (5), where E 1 = a 1 C 1 ,
For European equity puts and calls (with respective prices p t and c t ), with the same strike price (K) and expiring at the …rst-out ‡ow date (T 1 ), from put-call parity at T 1 ,
Then, from the law of one price, put-call parity at t = 0 becomes
The call price is given by
As in the case of a paying-dividend stock, put-call parity is also adjusted, in this case, by e rT 1 B 1 Q (V 1 > Y 1 ).
Speci…cally, for LSP puts (i.e., K B 1 ), from equation (12),
which implies the following surviving probability, c 0 (K 1 ) c 0 (K 2 )
For no LSP puts (i.e., K > B 1 ), from equation (16),
A default corridor in an endogenous setting
We show the link between European puts and credit protection is given by endogenous default.
The endogenous credit-risk model
We study a general discrete-time setting with stochastic cash ‡ows. Consider a model with N periods, n = 1; 2; :::; N , and respective times 0 < T 1 < T 2 < ::: < T N . We denote by B n the negative payout rate of the …rm. Thus, B n is an out ‡ow that is paid if B n > 0 (an in ‡ow that is collected if B n < 0) by equityholders'deep pockets, in Leland's tradition.
The equity continuation value is denoted by C t . We assume equityholders'limited liability, implying C t 0, 0 t. It follows that if B n > 0, defaulting at T n is optimal if and only if C n B n , n = 1; 2; :::; N;
In addition, we also assume strictly positive values for the process C t ; that is,
which implies default is never optimal between out ‡ow dates.
2. Endogenous equity pricing Given a terminal value C N 0, the equity continuation value is de…ned recursively as follows:
for n = 1; 2; :::; N . The process C t is discontinuous at T n ; that is, lim t"Tn C t ! fC n B n g + < C n if B n > 0, n = 1; 2; :::; N:
Similarly, fC n B n g + > C n > 0 if B n < 0.
The ex-cash- ‡ow equity price, as in the previous coupon-bond model, is given by
for n = 1; 2; :::; N , where a 0 = 1 and a n is in equation (4). In particular, E t = C t ; 0 t < T 1 . The (ex-cash- ‡ow) equity-price function E n (C n ) is also discontinuous at T n . That is, either E n = 0 or E n = C n > B n > 0 if B n > 0, n = 1; 2; :::; N ,
both with positive probability. By contrast, in the case of a cash in ‡ow (i.e., B n < 0), and conditional on no previous default (i.e., a n 1 = 1), E n = C n > 0 if B n < 0.
Then C t > 0 implies E t = C t > 0 between out ‡ow dates, conditional on no previous default. It follows that default is never optimal between out ‡ow dates. Hence, we focus on out ‡ow dates. First, we provide an example.
Example In Figure 3 , we provide a typical equity path that ends in default at T 3 .
The …rm's assets mature in four periods. Three deterministic cash ‡ows exist, namely, B 1 = 5, B 2 = 4, and B 3 = 4 (i.e., B 1 < 0 is a cash dividend and B 2 , B 3 > 0 are debt service or out ‡ows). The assets are risky and have an expected value of 7:5 at T 4 . The value of the …rm is C 0 = E 0 = 6, which equals the intrinsic value (i.e., 5 4 4 + 7:5 = 4:5) plus some option/upside value (i.e., 6 4:5 = 1:5).
*** to include Figure 3 *** Equity value increases in the …rst period from E 0 = 6 to 7. Namely, right before T 1 , the value of equity is 7, that is, C 1 = E 1 = 7 5 = 2, which is the (downward-jumping) ex-dividend equity price. After this large dividend, most of the …rm value is option value (C 1 = 2). From T 1 to T 2 , the …rm remains stable. Right before T 2 , the value of equity is also 2, that is, C 2 = E 2 = 2 + 4 = 6, and the equity price jumps upwards.
However, after T 2 and a high-volatility period, the …rm quickly loses value and defaults at T 3 because C 3 = 3 is less than B 3 = 4. Hence, we advance that a default corridor [0; 4] exists at T 2 and T 3 .
At T 3 , it is optimal to equityholders to not absorb the debt service but default, which implies E t = 0, t T 3 . From C 3 = 3, and given no additional cash- ‡ows, V 3 is also close to 3 (which is less than the initial expected value of 7.5). In brief, after this poor path/performance, all stakeholders lose. Equityholders get 5 4 = 1, which is less than the initial equity value of E 0 = 6, and debtholders get 4 and 3, instead of the promised cash ‡ows of 4 and 4, which implies a loss of 1=8 for them.
3. The endogenous default event and the default corridor Implicit in the de…nition of the equity value (i.e., equation (32)) are N endogenous-default events;
that is, fC n B n g , n = 1; 2; :::; N:
These N endogenous-default events lead to the N default corridors, in which the excash- ‡ow equity price cannot enter. That is, from equation (33), E n = 2 (0; B n ] , n = 1; 2; :::; N:
In particular, the event fC n B n g is equivalent to fE n B n g, n = 1; 2; :::; N . Naturally, the event/corridor is empty if the cash ‡ow is an in ‡ow, that is, if B n < 0.
However, because the payout rate B n follows a random process, the N default corridors are conditional on B n . Therefore, assuming B n is one-period predictable, the only possible default corridor is at time T 1 and is given by for a put with maturity T 1 , the payo¤ reduces to max f0; K E 1 g = (K E 1 ) 1 fE 1 Kg (35)
which is a binary option in the case of LSP puts, namely, K B 1 . The second equality follows from equation (33). As emphasized above, the latter result only happens for n = 1, because B n is predictable yet stochastic for n > 1.
Then, from equation (33), E n = E n 1 fEn>Bng , from which follows 1 fE 1 =0g = 1 fE 1 B 1 g and hence max f0; K E 1 g = K 1 fE 1 B 1 g if K B 1 ;
which replicates a pure credit contract, where fE 1 B 1 g is the endogenous-default event at T 1 . In this setting, the DOOM put (that replicates a pure credit contract) is rather an LSP put.
5. The price of European puts in a default corridor Similar to the couponbond model, in which leverage is only …nancial (and B 1 = cD), from equation (36), the price of an LSP European put with maturity T 1 is given by
and the same implications follow as in section 3.
That is, LSP European-put prices are linear in the strike price, and the impliedvolatility skew is negative, 0 (K) < 0, K B 1 . Put options are more expensive in a default corridor than in a benchmark setting of no corridor. Put-call parity is adjusted by the cash out ‡ow (for t < T 1 ), and from this parity link, we price call options. All Figure 1 : From a default corridor [0; B] at T 1 , we show the implied-volatility curves generated by European put options. At T 1 , the value of equity equals V 1 1 fV 1 >Bg . We de…ne the corridor by B = 3. The lognormal assets volatility is = 30%, the interest rate is r = 2%, and the maturity is T 1 = 6 months. Equity and the European equity put have the same maturity. We consider four equity prices, E 0 = f2:03; 3:03; 4:03; 6:03g, corresponding to the four asset values, V 0 = f5; 6; 7; 9g, respectively. Cash dividend, B1=--5 Figure 3 : In a default corridor, a typical equity path that ends in default. The …rm's assets mature in four periods. Three deterministic cash out ‡ows exist, B 1 = 5, B 2 = 4, and B 3 = 4, where B 1 < 0 is a dividend and B 2 , B 3 > 0 are debt payments. The initial value of the …rm is E 0 = 6. At T 1 , equityholders receive a dividend of 5, and equity falls from 7 to 2. T 1 to T 2 is a calm period, equityholders pay a debt service of 4, and equity jumps from 2 to 6. After T 2 and a high-volatility period, the …rm quickly loses value, and equityholders choose defaulting at T 3 because the value of the assets is 3, which is less than the debt service of 4. That is, E t = 0, t T 3 .
